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Faculty and Deans

UNREVIEWABILITY IN STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW1
By: Charles H. Koch, Jr. 2
Unreviewability doctrine is not often important in either federal
or state administrative law but, when it is important, it is very, very
important. It determines whether an agency decision will receive any
judicial scrutiny at all. Therefore, it raises a threshold question for each
challenge to agency action. It establishes ultimate agency power and
defines judicial authority over certain administrative programs.

A.

Three Categories ofUnreviewability

The Federal APA, Section 701(a), defines the type of
administrative action for which review is precluded. Section 701(a)(l)
provides for statutory preclusion. Section 701(a)(2) provides that
agency decisions are reviewable "except to the extent that-(2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." This section has been
held to preclude review where the delegation of authority to the agency
is so complete as to leave no role for a court.
From this is usually derived two categories of review
preclusion. First, a statute may preclude review of either an entire
category of administrative decisions or specific aspects of certain
administrative decisions. Statutory preclusion is very closely
circumscribed. Second, an administrative scheme may provide no basis
on which to evaluate an agency's resolution and hence implies such
complete administrative authority and decision making freedom,
"discretion," that the courts are not left any role. 3
1

Derived from 3 Koch, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, 2d §§ 13.1-13.6

(1997).
2

Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
The term "discretion" pervades administrative law even more than other legal
disciplines. Yet, it is one of the most unsatisfactory phrases in law. Discretion has many
meanings, especially in application. In judicial review, for example, the existence of
"discretion" may mean that the decision is unreviewable or reviewable only for abuse. The core
meaning of the term discretion is some degree of decision making freedom and independence.
3
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As will be discussed below, these two categories do not
satisfactorily include all the administrative decisions the courts have
found unreviewable. Another look at 701(a)(2)suggests an additional
category that cover these cases. The term "by law" might be said to
instruct a court to infer unreviewability from "law" other than a
statutory delegation. That is, some doctrine, other than compliance
with a statute, may dictate that courts have no function with respect to
the controverted issues. A third category emerges in which the agency
acquires complete administrative authority and decision making
freedom by the operation of law, either judge-made common law or an
interpretation of constitutional doctrine. This category then adds to the
notion of "unreviewable discretion." 4
These three categories organize state, as well federal,
unreviewability doctrine. Even in the absence of statutory language like
that in Section 701(a) of the Federal APA, state law can be found to
establish all three forms of review preclusion. 5 A statute may preclude
review or a statute may delegate such complete authority, discretion,
that review is necessarily precluded. In addition, other legal principles
embodied in state law may dictate against review.

B.

Confining the Operation of Unreviewability

Unreviewability doctrine is always guided by the principle that,
although unreviewability is recognized, it is not preferred. 6 In state as

The degree of such decision making freedom and independence in the particular context
emerges as a crucial question. Here, the decision making freedom must be found to be so
complete that the courts may not perform a monitoring function.
4
Some urge that all such decisions are reviewable for abuse. However, review for
abuse is review and injects the courts into the decision making process in violation of the law
discussed here.
~Neither the 1961 nor the 1981 version of the model state APA deal with
unreviewability. A Westlaw search using a variety of search terms did not uncover such
language in state APAs.
&rhe federal APA expressly recognizes unreviewability in 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a) but very
few decisions of federal agencies are unreviewable. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the presumption in favor of reviewability. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,
498 U.S. 479, Ill S.Ct. 888, ll2 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 2135, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). William
Eskridge, however, observed that the "presumption of reviewability is not as robust as it once
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well as federal law, the general principle is that: "All final
administrative actions are presumptively reviewable. "7 In both state
and federal law, only clear command may overturn this presumption. 8
In addition to this presumption, wrreviewability is often further
confined to specific issues so that other issues in a decision might be
reviewable. Each administrative decision involves the resolution of a
bundle of issues and only certain categories of issues within that bundle
might be made wrreviewable. 9 If the entire decision is made
unreviewable or the controverted issues all fall into one of the
categories discussed below, then the entire decision is unreviewable.
In many cases, however, only some of the controverted issues are
wrreviewable and the decision is still reviewable as to the remainder of
the controverted issues. 10 On the other hand, a court cannot create
review authority by artificially carving out reviewable issues.''
Review of constitutional questions may be precluded by
expressed language only. The Supreme Court in Webster v. Doe
reaffirmed the general concept that constitutional questions may be
made wrreviewable but added that Congress must make such intentions
clear.'2 "[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear." 13 The Court

was." William Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Politics of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va.L.Rev. 275, 331 n.l53 (1988).
7
E.g., Usibelli Coal Mine Inc. v. State, 921 P.2d 1134, 1150 (Alaska 1996).
8
Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E. 2d 251,254 (Ill. 1996).
9
ContrastJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,94 S.Ct. 1160,39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974)
(The constitutional issues were not unreviewable even though other parts of the administrative
decision were made unreviewable by statute.) with Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614, 104
S.Ct. 2013, 2021, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (Any claim "inextricably intertwined" with an
unreviewable claim will also be unreviewable.).
10
E.g., Scarabin v. DEA, 919 F.2d 337,338 (5th Cir.l990), rehearing denied 925
F.2d 100 (5th Cir.l991); Marble Mountain Audubon Soc. v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 181-182 (9th
Cir.1990); see, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, Ill S.Ct. 888, 112
L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991).
11
Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671,675 (D.C.Cir.l994).
12
Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,601, 108 S.Ct. 2047,2053, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988),
on remand 859 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.1988) (Following the law made as to statutory preclusion,
5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(1), in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389
(1974)).
13
486 U.S. at 601.
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reaffirmed that holding in Lincoln v. Vigil. 14

C.

Review Precluded by Statute

Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress power to
create lower federal courts and thereby is generally interpreted as
granting plenary legislative authority to define the jurisdiction of those
courts. An act then may preclude review of specific agency action. 15
This principle has been established in state law as well. One
exception is Illinois where its Supreme Court has gone so far as to limit
its legislature's power to preclude review because it found that any
preclusion that infringed on the judiciary's "inherent powers" violated
separation of powers principles. 16 Nonetheless, state legislatures are
generally found empowered to preclude judicial review of some agency
determinations. 17
The extent of review preclusion in the states may be very
limited. A Westlaw search using a variety of search terms uncovered no
state AP A provisions recognizing statutory unreviewability. In addition,
that search found very few state statutory provisions explicitly
precluding review of administrative decisions. In the absence of explicit
language, however, state courts as well as federal courts, on occasion,
find review preclusion in less direct statutory language.
The key question is how clear the intent to preclude must be.
The U.S. Supreme Court consistently limits this authority. It has
continually reiterated the general principle that review may only be
precluded by "clear and convincing evidence" oflegislative intent to do

14

Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 2033, 124 L.Ed.2d 101
(1993), on remand 2 F.3d 1161 (lOth Cir.l993).
15 E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d
29 (1994).
16
Ardt v. Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation, 607 N.E.2d 1226, 1231-1232
(1992).
17 See New York City Department of Environmental Protection v. New York City
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 N.Y.2d 318, 574 N.Y.S.2d 664, 579 N.E.2d 1385 (1991) (Review of
personnel decisions precluded.).
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so. 18 The classic Abbott Laboratories opinion suggested to some that
review preclusion must be found within the statutory language itself. 19
In general, the Court has not limited itself to the statutory language but
has attempted to discover legislative intent where the language is not
clear. It has looked beyond the words of the statute to legislative history
and even the nature of the administrative scheme.20 State courts can be
expected to do likewise.
The Virginia Supreme Court, for example, was not reluctant to
find review preclusion from the statutory scheme. The opinion of the
Virginia Supreme Court in the Virginia Beach case took a decidedly
formalistic approach. 21 A not-for-profit conservation group sought to
challenge a zoning board decision granting a variance which allowed
a hotel to erect a neon sign. The Court held that the organization did not
have "standing" under the state APA to challenge the decision because
it found that statute precluded challenges by such groups.
The Virginia Courts approach is reminiscent U.S. Court's
approach in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute. 22 There, consumers
sought to challenge a milk "market order" but the Court found that the
statute limited challenges to producers and wholesale marketers of milk
products. The Court analyzed this case as a reviewability question,
relying on the federal APA § 701(a)(l), even though it confronted a
standing like question in that, while such agency decisions were
reviewable, they were not reviewable through an action by these

18

Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 64, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2499,
(1993)(Citing a long line of authority).
19
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511 (1967).
2
°For example, in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, it said:
"Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is
determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the
administrative action involved." Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S.
340, 345, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2453, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984).
21

Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City
of Virginia Beach, 344 S.E.2d 899 ( 1986).
22
Biock v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345-346, 104 S.Ct. 2450,
2453-2454, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984).
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litigants.
While the Virginia Court's result was the same, unlike the U.S.
Court in Block, the Virginia Court confined itself to the statutory
language. 23 It found that since the statute provided for actions by
"aggrieved" parties only, an action by those without a legal interest was
not reviewable. 24 Since the organization owned no real estate and
indeed had no commercial interest, it could not be a party aggrieved
within this statutory language. Unfortunately, Virginia has no
legislative history for the Court to consult had it been disposed to do so.
However, a fair reading of the statute and consideration of the intent of
statutory scheme should have driven the Virginia Court to conclude that
review was not so limited. Indeed, the Virginia AP A was designed to
subject agencies to judicial scrutiny and organize, rather than block,
challenges.
The breadth of the search for legislative intent will, of course,
cut both ways and lead to a finding against an effort to preclude review.
In Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 25 the Supreme
Court found that the statute did not preclude review. Although it
started with the statutory language, it looked at the administrative
scheme and the legislative history before concluding that review was
not precluded. The Supreme Court has also found that silence about the
type of review available will not establish the intent to preclude
review. 26
Even if the statute precludes some review, the review preclusion
should be confined to the extent consistent with the best administration
of the particular program. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of

23

1t should be noted also that the Virginia Court saw the issue as "standing," and
Block could also be so classified, showing the interrelationship between reviewability and
fundamental "justiciability" principles, such as standing (who may seek review), ripeness
(when may they do so) and political question (scope of"judicial power").
24
344 S.E.2d at, 902-903.
25
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 106 S.Ct. 2133,
90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986).
26
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56-57, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2495,
125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993), on remand 996 F.2d 221 (9th Cir.l993).
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1986 expressly precluded review of INS denials of special status except
in the context of a deportation order. 27 The Supreme Court, in McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., determined that review was permissible
in a class action alleging that the agency's procedures violated the Act
and the due process clause. 28 The Court found that Congress intended
to preclude review for individual denials only. 29 It seemed to require
very explicit congressional language for those situations where the
intent is to preclude "generic constitutional and statutory claims. "30
Thus, review of general policy or agency practice is not precluded by
statutory language precluding review of individual decisions. 31 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in McNary, disagreed that Congress had
not intended to preclude this type of review. He read the statute as
providing very limited review and thereby "Congress intended to
foreclose all other avenues of relief. "32

D.

Unreviewable Discretion Created by the Absence of
a Meaningful Basis for Review

A statute might give total authority to the administrative
decision maker so as to leave no role for the courts. That is, the statute
may not expressly preclude review as discussed above but may delegate
so much authority to the agency that there is none left for the courts.
Such a grant is said to create "unreviewable discretion." Unreviewable
discretion exists when the decision maker is to have complete authority
and not share its authority with the courts. 33

27

100 Stat. 3359.
'McNruy v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d
1005 (1991).
29
498 U.S. at 492, Ill S.Ct. at 896.
30
498 U.S. at 493-499, 111 S.Ct. at 897-899.
31
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2495, 125
L.Ed.2d 38 (1993), on remand 996 F.2d 221 (9th Cir.1993) (Reaffirming the decision in
McNary.).
32
498 U.S. at 501, Ill S.Ct. at 901.
33
E.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994),
rehearing denied 512 U.S. 1247, 114 S.Ct. 2771, 129 L.Ed.2d 884 (1994). All nine justices,
in one way or another, agreed that base closing decisions under the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 were committed to the President's unreviewable discretion.
2
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In the search for unreviewable discretion, however, it must be
remembered that the mere fact that the statute grants "discretion" does
not necessarily make the agency's action unreviewable. 34 The term
"discretion" has several meanings involving a range of administrative
authority and decision making freedom. Sometimes courts must
recognize that the agency's authority and decision making freedom is
so complete that they have no function in that particular decision.
Usually, however, an administrative exercise of discretion may be
reviewed. The federal APA recognizes reviewable discretion as well as
unreviewable discretion and provides in § 706 for review of certain
types of discretion for "abuse".

1. No meaningful standards
The existence of unreviewable discretion often derives from the
absence of standards by which a court may evaluate the agency
decision. The Overton Park opinion is the seminal case recognizing
this basis for unreviewable discretion. There, the Supreme Court found
that unreviewable "absolute discretion" exists when the statute left the
courts "no law to apply. "35 That is, a court should not attempt to review
where the statute lacks meaningful standards whereby a reviewing court
might evaluate the agency's exercise of discretion. The theory is that
since Congress provided no basis upon which courts can evaluate the
agency resolution it intended no role for the courts.
The Overton Park test established a fairly straightforward and
often cited test for determining whether Congress had so committed the
decision to the agency's authority as to preclude review. Federal courts
frequently apply that test in order to determine unreviewability. 36
34

Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir.1994).
sCitizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413, 91 S.Ct. 814,
822, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), on remand 335 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Tenn.1972), opinion
supplemented 357 F.Supp. 846 (W.D.Tenn.1973), order reversed 494 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir.1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 991,95 S.Ct. 1997,44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975).
36
Padavan v. U.S., 82 F.3d 23,29 {2d Cir. 1996); Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d
787, 789 (6th Cir.1991), rehearing denied 961 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.l992) (Army decision to
privatize food services); Scalise v. Thornburgh, 891 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied
494 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1815, 108 L.Ed.2d 945 (1990) (international prisoner transfers);
Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.1994) (FAA suspension of pilot examiner
3
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State courts are also likely to judge whether a delegation is so
complete as to preclude review by searching for meaningful standards.
In Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, for example, the
state agency asserted that it had exercised unreviewable discretion. 37
Neighborhood residents challenged a decision by a housing authority
to fund a proposed low income housing project in their area. The state
housing authority asserted that the act committed decisions about its
projects to its "sole discretion." The Illinois Supreme Court applied the
Overton Park "no law to apply" test to determine whether the agency's
discretion was indeed so complete as to preclude review. It found
meaningful standards whereby it could evaluate the decision and that
the standards were "mandatory."38 It therefore concluded that "[The
agency's] decision ... is obviously entitled to great de(erence. But this
deference is best assured by subjecting that decision only to review to
determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious and not by insulating it
from judicial review altogether."39
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court found unreviewable
discretion in Hanrahan v. Williams. 40 Hanrahan sought review of the
Illinois Prisoner Review Board's decision to deny him parole. The
Board claimed that it had absolute discretion in parole decisions. The
appellate court found sufficient standards to support review and noted
that federal courts reviewed similar decisions in habeas corpus actions.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that whereas the
statute provides standards for denying parole the act did not "state when
the Board must grant parole."41 Because the guidelines were not
mandatory, the Board was not compelled to grant a parole and hence a

designation); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410-1412 (lOth Cir.l990) (whether
United States possesses federal reserve water rights under the wilderness act); Chiles v. U.S.,
69 F.3d 1094, 1096 (lith Cir. 1995); Clifford v. Pena, 77 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
37
Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 111.2d 462, 120 Ill. Dec. 531,
524 N.E.2d 561 (1988).
38
534 N.E.2d at 578.
39
524 N.E.2d at 578.
40
Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E. 2d 251, 254 (Ill. 1996), citing Greer v. Illinois
Housing Dev. Auth., 524 N.E. 2d 561 (1988) (Citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,91 S.Ct. 814 (1971) and Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct.
1649 (1985).).
41
673 N.E.2d at 255.
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court has "no law to apply."42 Thus, it concluded that "the legislature,
in drafting the statutory language, intended the Board to have complete
discretion in determining whether to grant parole when the denial of
parole is not mandated by statute."43 This conclusion, as discussed
below, was bolstered by existing Illinois law precluding review of
parole decisions.

2. Decisions for which review standards are impossible
A similar but fundamentally different case is presented by those
discretionary decisions that seem by their nature impossible to review.44
Because meaningful standard cannot be rendered for some decisions,
there cannot be "law to apply" for the purposes of review. Thus, those
decisions are made through the exercise of absolute decision making
freedom but not because the legislature did not provide standards but
because it cannot provide standards. By empowering the agency to
make a decision of this nature, the legislature can be said to have
intended that the agency have absolute discretion.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Hanrahan was driven to its
determination that parole decisions were unreviewable partly because
it was confronted with decision making of this varietyY The Court
noted: ''the highly subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release
decision, along with the fact that there are no standards sufficiently
objective to allow a court to evaluate the Board's decision ... , sets the

4

2-Jbe Court also noted that the board's rules provided that paroles would be granted
"as an exercise of grace and executive discretion." Agency rules, however, cannot be allowed
to affect reviewability. That the rules assert absolute discretion cannot be used to conclude that
the agency has such discretion. On the other hand, that the agency promulgates rules to guide
the exercise of absolute discretion granted by statute cannot be used as standards for the
purpose of establishing reviewability. Not only would such an approach distort the legislative
will in allocating authority between the agency and the courts but it would create regrettable
disincentives to the agency.
43
673 N.E.2d at 255.
44
Charles Koch, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Discretion, 54 G. W.L.Rev. 469,
502 ( 1986). Dworkin calls this a strong sense of discretion. Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, at 32 (1977). Jaffe, writing directly about administrative discretion, observed that
a special discretion exists when an agency is to make an "intuitive leap" from relevant factors
to a decision. Louis Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 556 ( 1965).
45
Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E 2d 251 ,256-257 (Ill. 1996).
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parole-release decisions apart from other cases."46 Decisions such as
predictions can be judged correct only after the anticipated event and
hence cannot be evaluated in the normal sense (although a court might
monitor factors such as process and adequacy of the agency's
consideration). A court can only substitute its prediction for that of the
agency assigned that responsibility and to do so would be arrogating
decision making authority granted to the agency.
The reality of such decision making is difficult to accept.
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor, among others, has conceded that such
discretion does exist in the administrative law system. She observed:
"Some decisions, in short, may turn more on experience and intuition
than on any listing of reasons, factors, standards, or the like. "47 Others
have wrestled with the indisputable existence of "unknowable"
elements in administrative decisions. 48 Several observers have urged the
benefits of such bureaucratic decision making. 49 Such a decision
making process takes advantage of the agency as a decision making
community to create a "decisional synergism." 50 In reviewing this type
of decision making, the important consideration is not the decision
itself but the proper merging of administrative decision making
elements. If a court attempts to do more, it would rob the process of its
intended richness. 5 1

46

673 N.E. 2d at 257.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion ofJudicial Review in England
and the United States, 27 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 643, 655 (1986).
48
See Richard Pierce, Sidney Shapiro, & Paul Verkuil, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS§ 7.3.4 (1985).
49
E.g., Jerry Mashaw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS, 75-75 (1983); Thomas McGarity, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE
ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSISINTHEFEDERAL BUREAUCRACY, 179 (1991).
50
Stephen Breyer, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 112 ( 1982) ("The Environmental
Protection Agency, for example, divided the problem of setting water pollution standards
among several of its divisions; it staffed different divisions with people possessing different
professional backgrounds (lawyers, business graduates, scientists); and it deliberately
encouraged argument among them, in hope of giving top decision makers a more objective
view."). See Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 1277, 1318
(1984) ("Bureaucracy ... is not an impersonal machine but a social system, a way of mobilizing
all aspects of human personality in order to transform individuals into a functioning group.").
51
For further discussion see Charles Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative
Discretion, 54 G.W.L.Rev. 469, 505-507 (1986).
47
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Unreviewable Discretion Created by Operation of
Law

The absence of a statutory basis upon which to evaluate the
agency decision is not the only test for unreviewable discretion. 52
Complete administrative authority and decision making freedom is
sometimes created by operation of law. For certain categories of
administrative decisions, tradition or common law has ordained a
system of unreviewable discretion. Similarly, constitutional principles
might operate to deprive the judiciary of a role in certain types of
administrative decisions.
1. Review precluded by traditional law
Traditional or common law has evolved unreviewability for the
exercise of "prosecutorial" discretion. The Hanrahan opinion, relying
on the federal authority discussed below, found that traditional
understanding supported its finding ofunreviewability. 53 As with this
federal authority, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to apply the
Overton Park "no law to apply" test. Yet, it was even more difficult
than in the federal cases to claim that there were no standards. First, the
appeals court found standards to apply and federal courts in similar
cases had found standards. Several state courts had found standards
although others had not. The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion lists
several fairly explicit standards. In the end, the Illinois Court rejected
the notion that these potential standards created "law to apply" because
the standards were not mandatory. This conclusion is extremely
unsatisfying.
The Illinois Court, like the key U.S. Supreme Court opinions it
applied, actually found that review of parole decisions was precluded
by operation of Illinois law. 54 After noting the difference among the
52

Ronald Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
Minn.L.Rev. 734 (1990) {"The Court could clarify its analysis by explicitly acknowledging
what it is already doing implicitly: it should cease treating the 'law to apply' test as the
exclusive standard for identifying actions that are 'committed to agency discretion.' ").
53 Hanrahan v. Willaims, 673 N.E.2d 251,256-257 (Ill. 1996).
54
673 N.W.2d at 255.
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several states, the Court observed: "It is apparent that each state must
decide, based on its own statutory scheme, whether the merits of parolerelease decisions are reviewable." In Illinois, the traditional law is that
parole decisions are unreviewable as determined by its Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court opinions it relied on similarly state the
"no law to apply" test but ultimately decide on the basis of traditional
law or common law. The U.S. Supreme Court's Heckler v. Chaney
opinion, for example, looked to the tradition of unreviewable
prosecutorial discretion. 55 Prison inmates brought actions to compel the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action
against the use of lethal injections to carry out the death penalty,
arguing that the drugs used were not approved by the FDA for human
executions. The issue was whether the decision not to act against this
drug use was committed to agency discretion in a way that precluded
review. 56 The district court, the circuit court and the Supreme Court all
began with the test for reviewability in Overton Park i.e. whether there
was a meaningful standard by which to evaluate the agency's decision. 57
Applying this test, the Court in Heckler found no controlling standard
and hence held that the FDA's decision was unreviewable.
However, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act includes
standards that judges could apply. 58 The real basis of the opinion was
the well-established principle against review of prosecutorial-type
discretion. This unreviewability, it found, has evolved into a
well-established doctrine that was not changed by the APA. 59 As

55

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).
470 U.S. at 827, 105 S.Ct. at 1653.
57
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 41o-413, 91 S.Ct.
814,820-822,28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), on remand 1971 WL 2720 (W.D.Tenn.1971).
58
While it is true that, as Justice Rehnquist points out, nothing in the statute compels
the Secretary to bring a case, the sections cited by the Court itself contain meaningful
standards. The injunction section, 21 U.S.C.A. § 332, refers to a section listing "prohibited
acts" (21 U.S.C.A. § 331 ), and the seizure section, 21 U.S.C.A. § 334, creates liability for
"adulterated or misbranded" goods (as the Court recognized § 352 further defines misbranded).
These are standards that courts regularly find meaningful and apply. In short, there was
sufficient "law to apply" and hence a court would have the capacity to review in accordance
with these standards but for the traditional acceptance of unbridled prosecutorial discretion.
59
470 U.S. at 831-832, 105 S.Ct. at 1655-1656.
56
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Justice Rehnquist stated: "For good reasons, such a decision [whether
to bring enforcement action or not] has traditionally been 'committed
to agency discretion,' and we believe that the Congress enacting the
APA did not intend to alter that tradition.... (APA did not significantly
alter the 'common law' of judicial review of agency action). "60 Thus,
the Court actually based its finding ofunreviewability on tradition and
not on the absence of standards.
Tradition as the basis for unreviewability was also the actual
concept at work in the more recent Webster v. Doe opinion.61 The
majority held that a CIA tennination decision was so committed to
agency discretion as to preclude review, except for serious
Justice Scalia, dissenting, found
constitutional questions. 62
constitutional questions precluded as well. He agreed with the assertion
made above that the "no law to apply" test does not describe the full
reach of the unreviewable discretion concept and he recognized that the
"law" that precludes review may be common law.63 This common law,
he observed, constitutes "a body of jurisprudence that had marked out,
with more or less precision, certain issues and certain areas that were
beyond the range of judicial review. "64 The personnel decision at issue
in Webster, like prosecutorial decisions, were traditionally
unreviewable.
The Supreme Court in Lincoln v. Vigil found unreviewable a
HHS's Indian Health Service decision to discontinue a program through
which disabled Indian children received clinical services. 65 It noted:
"The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another
administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to
[unreviewable] agency discretion. "66 It reasoned that the same factors
existed in such decisions as counciled against review in the type of

60

470 U.S. at 832, 105 S.Ct. at 1656 (emphasis added).
Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), on remand
859 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.l988).
62
486 U.S. at 601, 108 S.Ct. at 2053.
63
486 U.S. at 607, 108 S.Ct. at 2056 (Scalia J., dissenting).
64
486 U.S. at 607, 108 S.Ct. at 2056 (Scalia J., dissenting).
65
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993).
66
508 U.S. at 192, 113 S.Ct. at 2031 (Emphasis added).
61
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decisions confronted by the Heckler opinion. 67
Thus, the
unreviewability was justified by balancing a number of factors,
including agency expertise, the statutory mandate, and advantages the
agency has over the courts in making such decisions. 68 Supervision of
such decisions, it felt, is for Congress and not the courts. 69

2. Review precluded by constitutional principles
In some cases, the law that creates the unreviewable discretion
is based on constitutional interpretation. Such decisions differ from
traditionally unreviewable discretion in that the "law" making the
decision unreviewable has some constitutional force. 70 Often there is
a very strong separation of powers argument that supports the
conclusion that such decisions are entirely within the constitutional
powers of the executive and the judicial branch is precluded from
involving itself in them.
Uniquely executive decisions would generally fall into this
category.71 A number of cases have upheld the strength of this doctrine.
Some involve questions of foreign affairs. 72 Others involve issues
related to the military .73 General considerations of "national security"

67

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1655, 84 L.Ed.2d 714

(1985).
68

508 U.S. at 192, 113 S.Ct. at 2032.
508 U.S. at 193, 113 S.Ct. at 2032.
7
0Jn our early constitutional history, there was no acceptance of absolute prosecutorial
discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 844-849, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1663-1665, 84
L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
71
Dina v. Attorney General of United States, 793 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir.1986).
72
Miranda v. Secretary ofTreasury, 766 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.l985) (upholding license
denial by the secretary of state acting under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act);
Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1428,
47 L.Ed.2d 360 (1975) (upholding the dismissal of a taxpayer challenge to military and
economic assistance to Israel); U.S. Information Agency v. Krc, 905 F.2d 389, 396
(D.C.Cir.1990), on remand 1991 WL 166683 (D.D.C.1991) (Foreign Service personnel
decisions); see Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C.Cir.1991), cert. denied 503 U.S.
995, 112 S.Ct. 1698, 118 L.Ed.2d 408 (1992) (The court relied on the Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons.).
73
National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 406
(D.C.Cir.1990) (base closing recommendations); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v.
Department of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 423 (2d Cir.1989) (Navy's failure to consider certain
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might support unreviewability. 74 Decisions involving "political
questions" may involve the exercise of unreviewable discretion. 75
Unlike the common law sources of unreviewability, constitutionally
based unreviewability is unassailable directly. 76

F.

Summary

There is a strong presumption in favor of review of
administrative action and the law in both the federal and state systems
precludes review in only three categories of cases. First, a statute may
preclude review of either an entire category of administrative decisions
or specific aspects of administrative decisions. Second, an
administrative scheme may provide no basis on which to evaluate an
agency's resolution, "no law to apply," and hence will imply such
complete administrative authority and decisionmaking freedom,
"discretion," that the courts have no basis on which to review. Third,
the "operation of law," either judge-made common law or an
interpretation of constitutional doctrine, may leave the courts no role.

classified aspects in an environmental impact statement).
74
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), on remand
859 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.l988); Doe v. Cheney, 885 F.2d 898,903-904 (D.C.Cir.l989).
"Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973).
76
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 618-621, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2062-2063 (1998) (J.
Scalia, dissenting, severely criticized the majority for failing to recognize the constitutional
imperative for unreviewability in the case before them.).

